Manpower Dilemmas in Kuwait: Scope for Indigenous Job Creation Through Attrition of the Foreign Workforce by Looney, R.E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1990
Manpower Dilemmas in Kuwait: Scope
for Indigenous Job Creation Through
Attrition of the Foreign Workforce
Looney, R.E.
Looney, R.E., "Manpower Dilemmas in Kuwait: Scope for Indigenous Job Creation Through
þÿ A t t r i t i o n   o f   t h e   F o r e i g n   W o r k f o r c e ,    O r i e n t ,   v o l .   3 1 ,   n o .   3 ,   S e p t e m b e r   1 9 9 0 .
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40612

Robert E. Looney 
Manpower dilemmas in Kuwait 
Scope for indigenous job creation through attrition of the foreign workforce 
Introduction 
At the time of the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait was facing a number of complex decisions con-
cerning its development strategy. Clearly economic adjustment to lower oil revenues 
and the uncertainties created by the Gulf war had been the main constraints to growth 
in the 1980s. By time of the invasion, however, economic diversification and the genera-
tion of productive employment opportunities for a growing population had become the 
country's major challenges. In fact, deficieny in the quantity and quality of indigenous 
human resources was perceived1 to be the most important bottleneck to progress 
throughout the entire Gulf region. 
For industrialization and economic diversification to succeed (and in order to reduce 
the region's over-dependence on expatriate labor), a higher percentage of nationals 
needed to be trained in managerial, technical and operational skills. At the time of the 
invasion, the task facing policy makers in Kuwait and the other Gulf countries was 
upgrading the capacity of the national workforce to the point where they could play a 
more active role in the productive sectors of their economies. Perhaps as important, 
workers themselves had to develop new attitudes towards technical and blue-collar jobs. 
Problems of mobilizing human resources in the region were not only limited to train-
ing and acquisition of new skills and attitudes towards certain jobs, they also included 
reforming the wage structure by skill and occupation, upgrading the educational in-
frastructure, as well as integrating women into the labor force. A major problem facing 
planners in Kuwait was the increasing unemployment problem among Kuwaiti 
graduates. 2 
In fact, attrition of the foreign workforce, and I or changing its ethnic composition 
from Arab to cheaper Asian workers was originally conceived as a means of reducing 
the country's foreign exchange outflow. Increasingly, however, foreign workforce reduc-
tion was being seen as necessary in order to provide jobs for Kuwait nationals. Here the 
main issues were: What was the scope for reducing the size of the foreign workforce? 
In what areas would this be most advantageous in terms of opening up positions for 
Kuwaitis? Which foreign ethnic groups would be affected? 
Analyses of manpower planning issues in the Gulf region have been limited in the past 
by the unavailability of relevant data. Kuwait was an ideal country for examination 
because it was the one exception to this general rule. A number of detailed census and 
surveys were available in the country, providing an in-depth picture of the labor force, 
by occupation and, in the case of foreign workers, by national origin. 
1 Gulf Economic and Financial Report (Manama, Bahrain: Gulf International Bank), May 1988, p. I. 
2 Victor Mallet, ,,Foreigners feel the Pinch," Financial Times (February 23, 1989), p. 14. 
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Distribution of the workforce 
Clearly, had there been no invasion, human resource constraints would likely have 
determined how effectively Kuwait would be able to deal with its development in the 
years ahead. At the time of the invasion, 60 percent of Kuwait's population of just under 
two million were foreigners, and the non-Kuwaitis made up around 83 percent of the 
total workforce. In some sectors, such as construction and manufacturing, virtually all 
workers were foreign. 
With regard to shifts in the Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti sectoral composition of the 
workforce, several interesting patterns had developed over the years: 3 
- Despite stepped-up investment in industry following the 1973/74 oil price increases, 
few jobs had been created for Kuwaitis in manufacturing. In fact, by 1985, there were 
considerably fewer (4,692) Kuwaiti workers in manufacturing than before the oil 
price increases (6,109). At the same time, the number of foreign workers in manufac-
turing had nearly doubled, increasing from 25,982 in 1970 to 46, 3'J'7 in 1985. 
- The well-publicized expansion of the financial sector had created additional jobs for 
Kuwaitis. Over the decade l'J'75-85, Kuwaiti employment in this sector increased at 
an annual average rate of 13.3 percent per annum (non-Kuwaiti employment in the 
sector increased at 15.8 percent per annum during the same period.) 
- By far the highest proportion of the labor force was employed in the social services. 
This sector accounted for 43.9 percent of the workforce in l'J'70. By l'J'75, this figure 
had risen to 53.7 percent. While the ratio fell to 44.0 percent in 1980, it had increased 
to nearly 49 percent by 1985. 
These trends have continued into the late 1980s. As of March 1988: 
- Over 77 percent of Kuwaitis worked in the social and personal services sector. The 
corresponding percentage of non-Kuwaitis was 53.8 percent. 
- No other sector of the economy employed over 10 percent of the Kuwaiti population 
- the highest being transport and communications which employed 6.7 percent of 
the Kuwaitis that year. 
- In contrast, the non-Kuwaiti population was fairly well diversified by sector, with 
15.6 percent of the population in construction, 11.6 in wholesale and retail trade and 
7.3 percent in manufacturing. 
Composition of the foreign workforce 
Simultaneously with the sectoral shifts in the ethnic composition of the total workforce, 
the non-Kuwaiti workforce had undergone a dramatic change in recent years. Initially, 
immigration was encouraged from countries which shared common characteristics with 
Kuwait, emphasis being placed on Arab integration and co-operation. Arab ministers in 
employment conferences in 1965 and l'J'75 attempted to conclude agreements of labor 
transfer between Kuwait and other Arab countries including Egypt and Tunisia, but 
without success. In fact, from l'J'75, Asian manpower, particularly from Korea and the 
Philippines, added a new element to the country's demographic pattern. 4 
3 Unless otherwise indicated, data are from: State of Kuwait, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1988 (Ministry of Planning, Cen-
tral Statistical Office, 1989). 
4 Abdulrasool AI-Moosa and Keith McLachlan, Immigrant Labor in Kuwait (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 7. 
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The gradual departure of skilled Arabs had increased the proportion of Asians in the 
population and at the time of the invasion they made up more than half the foreign labor 
force. 5 Specifically, the share of Arab workers had declined from 68.3 percent in 1970, 
to 46.5 percent in 1985. Asian workers had taken most of this share, increasing from 28.8 
percent in 1970, to 52 percent by 1985. In 1984, 81 percent of new work permits went to 
Asian nationalities, and less than 15 percent to Arabs (mainly Egyptians). Within this 
general pattern, there were several noteworthy trends. The three main Asian na-
tionalities in the late 1970s (Indians, Pakistanis and South Koreans) all had their share 
reduced, while Bangladeshis and other Asians (in particular Thais, Filipinos and Sri 
Lankans) had increased rapidly. 
While recent patterns of new labor inflows to Kuwait had been characterized by a 
trend towards an increasing Asian share, analysis by nationality had shown that work 
permit renewals accounted for a very high and growing share of all work permits issued 
to Arabs. 
- In 1977, 47.0 percent of work permits were renewals. By 1987, this percentage had 
risen to 66.3 percent. 
- Historically, several sectors have relied more on renewals rather than first time 
workers. These were manufacturing and wholesale I retail trade and the financial 
area. This suggests a quasi-permanent foreign workforce was manning these sectors. 
These trends have tended to undermine the country's policy oflocalization (,,Kuwaitiza-
tion") of the workforce. 
Productivity of the labor force 
In lieu of the invasion, the costs of Kuwaitization would have been largely determined 
by the productivity of the foreign workforce. Unfortunately, little data existed as to pro-
ductivity differences by ethnic group. Most of the available information was aggregate. 
These figures indicated that there had been a tendency of the Kuwaiti market to use 
foreign labor in a fairly inefficient, general purpose way. The result had been fairly low 
overall levels of productivity. 6 
Most observers noted a considerable visible element of disguised unemployment in so 
far as an appreciable number of foreign workers were engaged in marginal activities 
such as newspaper selling and minor services of the same type. 7 The productivity of 
such operations must have been low by any measure, which made little economic sense 
in a capital rich economy such as Kuwait's. 
In addition, the undertaking of menial tasks by foreigners in Kuwaiti homes and in 
general services did not appear to release Kuwaitis for more demanding occupations. 
Despite the extensive use of foreigners in households as housemaids, drivers and child 
caretakers, Kuwaiti participation in the labor force remained extremely low (males 32.2 
percent, females 4.8 percent and the average 19.l percent). In effect, foreign labor was 
used in menial tasks to substitute for Kuwaiti inputs which were then consumed in 
leisure activities. 8 
5 Victor Mallet, ,,Foreigners feel the Pinch," Financial Times (February 23, 1989), p. 14. 
6 Abdulrasool Al-Moosa and Keith McLachlan, Immigrant Labor in Kuwait (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 112. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Al-Moosa and McLachlan, Immigrant Labor in Kuwait (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 112, 113. 
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A further aspect of productivity that had received little attention was the depressing 
influence of a large and often ill-trained foreign workforce in Kuwait on the adoption of 
labor-saving technologies. Systems of construction, one of the largest consumers of 
labor in the country, were often labor-intensive, using primitive wooden scaffolding, 
manual setting of concrete frames and walling, and laborious means of putting floors or 
secondary fixings in place. Low-budget housing areas were particularly notable for their 
labor-intensive approach to building. Road construction, administration of the civil ser-
vice and other aspects of the economy showed features that appeared to be at odds with 
the real needs of a sparsely populated country. 9 
It might be argued that easy access to cheap, albeit underqualified labor had deterred 
the country from looking for more appropriate capital-intensive methods for expanding 
its economy and making it more efficient. With the passage of time, the state had 
become tied into the cheap labor syndrome and now operated and planned its future ac-
tivities on the basis of the availability of cheap imported labor. 10 
Yet the real interests of Kuwaitis might be better served through improving internal ef-
ficiency, first by merchandising activities to enable rising Kuwaiti productivity per in-
digenous inhabitant and second by mobilizing rather more thoroughly than at the pre-
sent Kuwaitis for participation in economic activities by making access to foreign labor 
more difficult or more expensive. Such a move would automatically tend also to force 
up levels of productivity among the expatriate workforce itself. 11 
Politically, however, the Kuwaiti private sector would resist any constraints on their 
option of mobilizing large numbers of relatively cheap (Asian) foreign workers. In addi-
tion, Kuwaiti merchants and traders favored the arrival of (Arab) non-national depend-
ants, to bolster local consumption and trade. Given these constraints, one compromise 
option open to the government might have been to pursue a general strategy replacing 
Asian workers with Arab expatriates in addition to Kuwaitis. Ultimately for this strategy 
to have been successful, Arab workers and Kuwaitis would have had to make a greater 
contribution to output than their Asian counterparts. 
Affects associated with the Dutch Disease 
The ethnic composition of the workforce undoubtedly played an important role in affect-
ing productivity in Kuwait. However, changes in productivity over time associated with 
this source were likely to have been masked by another factor, the impact of an ap-
preciating exchange rate on the relative growth of traded and non-traded goods. In par-
ticular, Kuwaiti industry may have been experiencing problems ultimately stemming 
from price distortions associated with the oil boom, or the so-called ,,Dutch Disease". 
In discussing the impact of the oil boom on the Kuwaiti economy one can distinguish 
between resource movement and spending effects. 12 Resource movement effects occur 
if the booming sector directly draws inputs away from the rest of the economy - a situa-
tion unlikely to have been of major significance in the Kuwaiti context. The spending ef-
9 Al-Moosa and McLachlan, op. cit., p. ll3. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Al-Moosa and McLachlan, op. cit., p. 113. 
12 Cf. J.P. Neary, ,,Real and Monetary Aspects of the Dutch Disease," in K. Jungenfeld and D. Hague eds., Structural Ad-
justment in Developed Economies (London: Macmillan, 1985); and W.M. Corden and J.P. Neary, ,,BooJilling Sector and 
De-industrialisation in a Small Open Economy," Economic Journal (1982), pp. 825-848. 
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feet involves a variety of issues but essentially results in a relative decline of the traded 
goods sector in favor of the non-traded goods sector. This occurs in combination with 
an increase in the price of non-traded relative to that of traded goods, or a real apprecia-
tion of the currency. It hinges on the presumption that the energy boom results in an im-
provement of the energy balance of trade, and that at least part of the oil revenues are 
spent on non-traded goods. 
In fact, a recent study13 found considerable evidence that these patterns have evolved 
over time in Kuwait: 
- The real share of the tradeable sector in non-oil GDP increased from 9.CJ7 percent in 
1966 to more than 14.5 percent in 1CJ74, but then declined to only 12.4 percent in 1CJ78. 
In contrast the private non-tradeable sector behaved in an opposite manner - its 
share continued to decline in the 1960s and early 1CJ70s (it reached 44.7 percent of 
non-oil GDP in 1CJ74), but after 1CJ74 it recovered strongly to contribute more than 
half of the non-oil real GDP in 1CJ78. The public non-tradeable sector, on the other 
hand behaved in a fluctuating manner, with a downward trend. 
- Not only did the real growth rate of the private non-tradeable sector surpass those of 
the tradeable and public non-tradeable sectors, but it also emerged in the 1CJ78-80 
period as the fastest employer. Employment in the private non-tradeable sector in-
creased from 24.46 percent of the total labor force in 1CJ75 to more than 32 percent 
in 1980. 
- Even though tradeable and public non-tradeable sectors managed to increase their 
absolute numbers oflabor employment (due to the large influx to foreign labor), they 
were not able to increase their relative shares in total employment. 
- Government expenditure on wages and salaries, which represents more than 80 per-
cent of current expenditure, increased by about 130 percent during the period 
1CJ72-78, although the increase in the size of Government employment was no more 
than 48 percent in the same period, reflecting the fact that nominal wages in the 
Government sector increased by more than 80 percent during the six year period. 
- Government expenditure increased by more than 250 percent during the 
1CJ73 I 74-1CJ77 I 78 period. Given the scarcity of indigenous labor, the huge increase in 
Government expenditure resulted in a large increase in the cost of labor, and also in 
intense real estate speculation which made real estate transactions more profitable 
than building new housing. As a result a severe housing shortage developed, which 
was reflected by the more than 80 percent increase in the rental index of housing dur-
ing 1CJ75-78. 
- In terms of relative rates of inflation, the price indices for the tradeable goods sector 
relative to the GDP price index was continually decreasing throughout the 1CJ74-78 
period. In other words, price inflation in the tradeable sector was decreasing relative 
to general domestic price inflation, whereas price inflation in private non-tradeables 
outpaced domestic inflation. Price responses of the public non-tradeable sector, on 
the other hand were less regular - possibly because of their largely administered 
prices and the dominance of the Government sector. 
13 Mohammad Al-Sabah, ,,The 'Dutch Disease' in an Oil-Exporting Country: Kuwait," OPEC Review (Sufl\lller, 1988), pp. 
129-144. 
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- The appreciation of the real exchange rate, (the GDP deflator for tradeable goods 
relative to the GDP deflator for private non-tradeable goods sectors), was a clear 
signal for private resources to be reallocated towards non-tradeable activities (like 
real estate speculations), while profitability in the tradeable sector tended to be 
squeezed between rising domestic costs and import competition. 
- During this period the importance of trade to the Kuwaiti economy increased con-
siderably. The trade balance was only about 11.5 percent of the GDP in 1970, but after 
the oil price increase of 1CJT3 /74, it increased tremendously with a value more than 
half the 1974 GDP. 
- The movements of the nominal exchange rate, however, in the period 1974-78 appear 
to have had a very weak linkage with particular components of the balance of 
payments. The Kuwaiti dinar's exchange rate was not very sensitive to changes in the 
current or capital account, perhaps because it was heavily influenced by the 
authorities' desire to curtail imported inflation. 
- There is a remarkable association between the real exchange rate, share of tradeable 
goods in non-oil GDP and non-oil trade deficits relative to GDP. Up to 1974, the real 
exchange rate was depreciating, with inflation in the tradeable sector far exceeding 
inflation in non- tradeables. The rise in the relative price of tradeable goods had 
presumably reduced the growth rate and demand for tradeables relative to non-
tradeables. This factor may go a long way in explaining the 28 percent reduction in 
the ratio of the non-oil trade deficit in GDP during the 1971-74 period. On the other 
hand, real depreciation, among other things had apparently stimulated growth in the 
tradeable sector and led to more than a 10 percent increase in the share of tradeables 
in non-oil real GDP. 
- The picture for 1974-78 is very consistent with the ,,Dutch Disease" model in that in 
the case of the real appreciation of the exchange rate, one would expect the growth 
in domestic demand for tradeables to increase relative to non-tradeables, which leads 
to an increase in the trade deficit and hence a squeeze in profitability of the tradeable 
sector relative to non-tradeables. In 'fact, real appreciation was associated with a 
substantial increase in the non-oil trade deficit, and a noticeable reduction in the 
share of the tradeable sector in non- oil real GDP. Interestingly enough the private 
non-tradeable sector, which was a major loser during the period of real depreciation 
made a remarkable recovery after the price shock of 1CJT3174. 
In sum, there was a convincing case for the existence of the Dutch Disease in Kuwait. 
On the other hand, a comparative analysis14 of the major oil producers indicates that 
Kuwait's overall growth in manufacturing was not much less than that of non-tradeables, 
suggesting that the Dutch Disease effects while significant overall, may have varied con-
siderably by subsector. A complete analysis of the impact of the Dutch Disease on the 
Kuwaiti economy therefore should be undertaken at the sectoral level rather than on the 
basis of traded versus non-traded goods. 
14 Michael Roemer, .. Dutch Disease in Developing Countries: Swallowing Bitter Medicine," in Mats Lundahl, The 
Primary Sector in Economic Development: Proceedings of the Seventh Ame Ryde Symposium, Frostavallen, August 
29-30 1983 (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 234-252. 
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A framework for analysis 
Despite the fact that data did not exist for the ethnic composition of the labor force by 
major sector of output, some inferences could be drawn as to those areas where non-
Kuwaiti Arab workers had made proportionately higher contributions to output than 
their Asian counterparts. As noted above, except for government services, the expatriate 
labor force dominated each of the major areas of output. Also, over the 1970-85 period, 
there had been considerable movement in the expatriate labor forces by ethnic groups, 
making identification of output impacts much easier than if these trends had been flat. 
In terms of the structure of the model used for estimation, recent research15 has 
shown that oil economies tend to experience adjustments over time to shocks stemming 
from injections of oil revenues and the resulting increases in government expenditures 
and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
For example, it can be demonstrated that an equation of the Koyck16 form: 
(a) y = aGDP + byL + z 
implies an exponential decay scheme, whereby the effects of a once and for all increase 
in oil dominated GDP would not only influence the demand for sector y's output during 
that period, but would also have (in declining terms) an impact on their level in future 
years. This result stems directly from the inclusion of the sectoral output lagged one year 
(byL) on the right hand side of the equation. 17 
Impact patterns along these lines are easy to imagine in Kuwait's case, where oil-
supported government expenditures are a large component of GDP. 18 Their increase 
would be felt heavily during the first few years subsequent to an increase in oil revenues, 
decaying gradually thereafter. 
The final form of the estimated equation was of the type: 
(b) y = aGDP(E) + byL + cARAB + dASIAN + eDU'ICH 
where: 
y = sectoral output 
yL = sectoral output lagged one year 
GDP(E) = Gross Domestic Product and expected GDP 
ARAB = the Arab expatriate workforce 
ASIAN = the Asian expatriate workforce 
DU'ICH = the Dutch Disease19 
To determine the relative contribution of the ethnic labor force, the equations were esti-
mated in step-wise fashion with the labor force term introduced after GDP. To verify that 
15 See for example Robert E. Looney, ,,The Impact of Petroleum Exports on the Saudi Arabian Economy," in Robert W. Stoo-
key ed., The Arabian Peninsula (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 37-64; and Robert E. Looney, 
,,The Impact of Defense Expenditures on the Saudi Arabian Private Sector," Journal of Arab Affitlrs (Fall 1987), pp. 198-229. 
16 Cf. L.M. Koyck, Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1954). 
17 P. Rao and Roger Miller, Applied Econometrics (Belmont, California, 1970), chapter 7. 
18 In the regressions that follow Gross Domestic Product was introduced as a control variable in two alternative forms: (a) 
the actual level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and (b) expected Gross Domestic Product (GDPE). Expected Gross 
Domestic Product was estimated from the equation GDP(t) = a + GDP(t-1). 
19 Defined as the real exchange rate. Since the exchange rate is Dollars I Dinar the anticipated sign for this term is negative 
for traded good sectors (manufacturing, agriculture etc.) and positive for non-traded activities (services etc.). 
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-sectoral output changes were due to increased labor and not (particularly in the case 
of services) movements in the relative exchange rate, the Dutch Disease term was in-
troduced to control for this factor. 
It shoul~ be noted that a positive sign on either of the workforce terms could con-
ceivably arise from factors other than the direct contribution to output. Logically this 
could come from: (a) demand effects whereby the increased size of the domestic market 
associated with expanded numbers of expatriate workers and their families stimulated 
domestic production. This might occur in some consumer good sectors where excess 
capacity existed at the time of rapid increases in the expatriate workforce, and would be 
more likely to occur with Arab rather than Asian workers, and (b) substitution effects 
whereby an expanded expatriate workforce simply frees Kuwaitis to enter that sector's 
output structure. As noted above, this effect is probably small and, in any case, would 
be most likely confined to the public services (not examined here). 
Results 
The results of the analysis of the ethnic composition of the foreign labor force on sec-
toral output reveal several interesting pattems20 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Kuwait: Impact of the foreign workforce on Sectoral output 
(t test for statistical significance) 
Sector Distributed Arab Asian Dutch 
Lag Term Workers Workers Disease 
Agriculture 2.79 - 4.12 4.82 insignificant 
Mining 2.11 - 1.65 - 1.94 insignificant 
Fishing insignificant - 3.15 1.86 insignificant 
Food insignificant 6.83 insignificant - 3.84 
Textiles insignificant 7.40 insignificant - 2.12 
Paper insignificant 2.49 - 1.84 insignificant 
Refining insignificant - 2.42 - 2.42 - 3.35 
Hotels 2.09 insignificant insignificant 2.04 
Transport 6.05 5.13 insignificant 3.61 
Communications 5.05 1.67 insignificant 1.40 
Finance 3.12 2.63 insignificant 1.71 
Insurance insignificant 2.74 insignificant insignificant 
Real Estate insignificant insignificant 2.91 1.69 
Private Services insignificant insignificant insignificant 2.58 
- In the case of primary output, Asian workers appear to have made a positive con-
tribution to agricultural output, whereas their Arab counterparts did not. The effect 
of Asian workers, however, was fairly weak, when controlling for Dutch Disease ef-
fects. 
- Neither Asian nor Arab workers appear to have significantly affected the pattern of 
mining in the country. 
- The other primary activity, fishing, as in the case of agriculture, appears to have been 
only slightly influenced with increased levels of Asian workers, but not Arab ex-
patriates. 
• 
20 Regressions were performed using ordinary least squares estimation technique incorporating a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
estimation procedure to correct for serial correlation. The full results are too extensive to be presented here. However, 
a copy of the complete analysis together with the underlying data base is available from the author upon request. 
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- Interestingly enough, in a number of activities a distributed lag-type mechanism 
does not appear to have existed. This indicates that output from these sectors was 
quite sensitive to short run factors, rather than the longer run gradual adjustment pro-
cesses., 
- Movements in the real exchange rate do not appear to have played a major role in af-
fecting primary output (after controlling for GDP and the labor force). 
In terms of the manufacturing sector, a somewhat different picture emerged: 
- Food production showed considerable effects stemming from movements in the Arab 
expatriate workforce, but not the Asian component. Dutch Disease factors, however, 
reduced the growth in this sector somewhat below what it would have been in the 
absence of the appreciating exchange rate. 
- The same pattern was present in textiles, where the increases in the non-Kuwaiti 
Arab workforce were associated with expanded levels of production. Again this ex-
pansion was dampened by the appreciation of the real dollar I dinar exchange rate. 
- Finally, paper products and petroleum refining followed the patterns identified in 
food production and textiles. 
In general, therefore, Arab workers had made a positive contribution to the expansion 
of Kuwaiti manufacturing, whereas increases in their Asian counterparts do not appear 
to have been particularly productive in this regard. 
With regard to private services it appears that: 
- Arab workers made a positive contribution to the expansion of hotels and restaurants, 
whereas their Asian counterparts did not. 
- The same was also true for transport and storage. In both cases the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate was a stimulus to output, in addition to the increased number 
of Arab expatriates in the workforce. 
- Communications also experienced a positive contribution from Arab expatriate 
workers, but this effect was only slight when the Dutch Disease variable was in-
troduced. 
- Finance followed the same pattern as the previous private services, with the excep-
tion that the Dutch Disease does not appear to be particularly significant when the 
Arab workforce was included in the regression equation. This result probably stems 
from the fact that finance faces more intense international competition than the other 
service sectors. 
- Insurance followed the pattern of the finance sector fairly closely, and one must 
assume for essentially the same reasons. 
- Real estate, however, did not follow the pattern of other private sectors. Here in-
creases in the Asian workforce, but not non-Kuwaiti Arab workers, were associated 
with expanded output. 
- Finally, private household services were more affected by economic prosperity (as 
reflected in the appreciation of the real exchange rate) than movements in the 
workforce per se. 
Conclusions 
In lieu of the Iraqi invasion, the results presented above had several implications for the 
country's employment programs. First a policy of Arabization would not have conflicted 
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with output, and if anything would probably have increased overall production. This is 
particularly the case with regard to the rapidly growing services and maintenance sec-
tors, together with the emerging industrial sector. 
The share of nationals in the productive sectors of the economy was expected to drift 
gradually upwards. A large number of national workforce entrants, denied their first 
choice of public sector employment (due to more or less constant levels of oil revenues), 
would have sought other opportunities in the private sector. This would represent a 
possible conflict with output and efficiency stemming from the fact that there were many 
types of manual jobs that Kuwaitis preferred not to perform either for cultural reasons 
or because pay levels were too low. These were largely the jobs held by the Asian 
workforce. 
While education at all levels in Kuwait had undergone remarkable improvements dur~ 
ing the preceding fifteen years, its capacity to accommodate future demands for certain 
skills and high level manpower remained limited. Most likely these deficiencies would 
have remained for some time until increasingly more students graduated from the ex-
panded school, university and vocational training system. Until enough nationals had 
been trained the country would most likely have continued depending on expatriates 
(largely Arabs) to undertake certain technical and managerial functions. This was par-
ticularly the case for jobs where experience and managerial expertise can only be 
achieved over decades. A process of Kuwaitization at too rapid pace and at the expense 
of Arab workers would most likely have resulted in falling productivity, output and na-
tional income. 
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